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PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
NATASHA MINSKER*
OVERVIEW
Professional responsibility by both defense attorneys and
prosecutors is critical in every criminal case. But when the state seeks
the ultimate punishment of death, attorneys on both sides should be
expected to adhere strictly to the highest standards of professional
conduct. Unfortunately, in death penalty cases in California, all too
often both prosecutors and defense attorneys fall far below this ideal
with little consequence.1 Indeed, our research reveals that even in the
most egregious case in which prosecutorial misconduct led to the
reversal of a death sentence in California, the prosecutor has never
been publicly disciplined. Further, we identified the prosecutors in six
out of eight death penalty cases that were reversed for prosecutorial
* Death Penalty Policy Director of the ACLU of Northern
California. Previously, Ms. Minsker spent five years at the Alameda County Public
Defender's Office. She also served as staff attorney to the Judicial Council of
California's Task Force on Criminal Jury Instructions, helping the committee
research and draft the CALCRIM instructions. She clerked for the Honorable
Martha Vazquez, Chief Judge of the Federal District Court of New Mexico, and is a
graduate of Stanford Law School.
Daniel Ballon contributed invaluable assistance to the research and writing of this
article. This article was first submitted to the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice in conjunction with its investigation into prosecutorial
misconduct in California. See http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/
prosecutorial/expert/ACLU%20Letter.pdf.
1. Indeed, two of the cases of actual execution discussed at length in this article
involve both prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.
Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); People v. Babbitt, 755 P.2d
253 (Cal. 1988). Thus, although this article focuses on the role of prosecutorial
misconduct in death penalty cases, it is important to consider both misconduct and
ineffective assistance of counsel together as they are often both present in cases that
result in questionable death sentences.
373
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misconduct. Five have "no public record of discipline," and one is a
sitting judge.2
Too frequently, prosecutors bend and even break the rules in an
effort to secure not just a conviction but a sentence of death. Because
of the high stakes involved in a death penalty trial, prosecutors are
under even more pressure than in a typical murder case. In some
cases, this pressure may make prosecutors cross more ethical lines
than in a lower profile case. In addition, because of the nature of the
decision the jury is asked to make, misconduct by prosecutors that
might be "harmless" as to the question of guilt can have a significant
impact in the penalty phase, producing what may be termed "wrongful
death sentences." 3 Improper comments by prosecutors, failure to
disclose mitigating evidence, and intentional disclosure of excluded
aggravating evidence are the kinds of misconduct by prosecutors that
may subtly, or not so subtly, cause a jury to vote for death in a case
that would have resulted in a life verdict if the prosecutor had "played
by the rules." Thus, misconduct in death penalty cases has a greater
impact than in non-death cases.
In this article, we describe the prosecutorial misconduct that
occurred in cases of actual execution in California. We also review the
death penalty cases where prosecutorial misconduct actually resulted
in or contributed to a reversal of the death sentence or conviction.
From this analysis we conclude that: a) whether the case is reversed or
the misconduct is deemed "harmless," there is often little difference
between the types of misconduct; b) the Rules of Professional
Responsibility are currently too vague to provide meaningful guidance
to prosecutors regarding their conduct in death penalty cases; and c)
current remedies for misconduct in death penalty cases are
insufficient.
REVIEW OF CASE HISTORIES: MISCONDUCT IN
CALIFORNIA EXECUTION CASES
We reviewed all thirteen cases that have resulted in actual
execution in California to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct
2. See text accompanying notes 48, 103-04, 111, 117, and 133.
3. Craig Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnation: Expanding the
Zone of Perceived Injustice in Death Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV.
131, 132-35 (2006).
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was an issue in any of these cases and, if so, how substantial that
misconduct was. We chose this sample of cases for several reasons.
First, we wished to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct
resulted in or contributed to any "wrongful executions," that is, the
execution of a defendant that was not supported by law or was
premised on incorrect facts. Second, we wished to determine whether
subsequent review by state and federal courts effectively identified
death penalty cases with substantial misconduct, preventing wrongful
execution and providing a meaningful remedy for any identified
misconduct. Third, we wished to compare the type of misconduct that
occurred in these cases that did not result in reversal with the type of
misconduct that occurred in cases that were reversed.
Our review of the cases of actual execution demonstrates that
prosecutorial misconduct has directly resulted in the execution of one
person who may not have been legally eligible for death and has
contributed significantly to the execution of another individual
suffering from severe mental illness who may not have been an
appropriate individual to execute. These two cases are the most
troubling of the California executions and present the most likely
cases of wrongful execution.
Moreover, of the thirteen executions which have taken place in
California since the death penalty was reinstated in 1977,
prosecutorial misconduct has been raised as a significant issue in
seven-more than half.4 In four of the seven cases, or thirty-one
percent, one or more reviewing courts explicitly found some of the
behavior to be "misconduct," "improper," or "error,",5 while in two
cases the courts failed to even address that critical issue, finding the
conduct "harmless" or "non-prejudicial" even if it was misconduct.6 In
4. Our review was limited to the published opinions in these cases. Thus, we
consider only those cases where the allegation of prosecutorial misconduct was
deemed significant enough for one or more reviewing courts to address, but may not
include all cases that might have raised this as an issue in the pleadings.
5. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 997 (9th Cir. 2005); Thompson, 120 F.3d
at 1055; People v. Rich, 755 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1988); Babbitt, 755 P.2d 253.
Prosecutorial misconduct has been defined as "improper" conduct. See ROGER M.
GOLDMAN & MARK J. KADISH, 6-8 CRIMINAL LAW ADVOCACY § 8.01 (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. (2008). It has also been defined as "prosecutorial error." See
People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 684 n.1 (Cal. 1998).
6. People v. Mason, 802 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1991); People v. Bonin, 758 P.2d 1217
(Cal. 1988).
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only one of the seven cases did the reviewing courts explicitly
conclude that there was insufficient evidence to establish misconduct,
but even in that case there was a forceful dissent.7 Indeed, the cases of
actual execution in California demonstrate that subsequent review by
the state and federal courts largely fails to address prosecutorial
misconduct in death penalty cases, with the courts sometimes failing
to even assess whether misconduct has occurred. In addition, a
comparison of the cases in which prosecutorial misconduct resulted in
or contributed to a reversal demonstrates that the misconduct involved
is similar, even at times identical, regardless of whether the case was
reversed.
THE CASE OF THOMAS THOMPSON
The case of Thomas Thompson presents the most disturbing
example of prosecutorial misconduct in an actual execution case in
California. 8 It is likely that Thompson did not commit a crime that
would have made him eligible for execution and that he would not
have been sentenced to death but for the misconduct of the trial
prosecutor. Moreover, the prosecutor's misconduct appears to have
been motivated solely by a desire to secure a death sentence, not
merely a conviction.
In September of 1981, Thomas Thompson and his roommate,
David Leitch, were arrested and tried for the rape and murder of
Ginger Fleischli. Leitch successfully moved to sever his trial from
Thompson's and the two men were tried separately. The prosecution
chose to try Thompson first. 9
At Thompson's trial, the prosecutor argued that Thompson alone
had raped Fleischli in the apartment and "then killed her in order to
prevent her from reporting the rape," all before Leitch returned home
that night. 10 To support this theory, the prosecution called two
jailhouse informants, Edward Fink and John Del Frate, to testify.1 On
7. Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rawlinson, J.,
dissenting).
8. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1045.
9. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1055-56.
10. Id. at 1056.
11. Id. At Thompson's trial, the prosecutor argued that the informants'
testimony was very reliable because they had "'no reason whatsoever [to] lie."' Id.
376 [Vol. 45
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direct examination Fink testified that Thompson had confessed to him
that he had raped and murdered Fleischli; that Leitch only learned of
the murder when he returned home; and that Leitch "merely assisted
Thompson in disposing of the body." 12 Del Frate testified that
Thompson alone stabbed Fleischli, causing her death.13 The testimony
of Fink and Del Frate was the only direct evidence that Thompson
personally raped and killed Fleischli.14 Without this testimony,
Thompson would not have been eligible for the death penalty.
The jury found Thompson guilty of rape and first degree murder,
and found true the special circumstance of a murder committed during
a rape. The jury subsequently voted to sentence Thompson to death.15
Months later, at Leitch's trial, the prosecution presented an
entirely different theory of the crime. At the second trial, the
prosecutor argued that Leitch and Fleischli had been dating; that
Leitch wanted Fleischli dead because she was interfering with his
attempts to reconcile with his ex-wife; that Leitch was the only person
with a motive to kill Fleischli; that Leitch had recruited Thompson to
help kill her; and that both men were directly involved in the killing,
though it was unclear who had actually stabbed Fleischli causing her
death. 16
The prosecutor did not call either Fink or Del Frate at Leitch's
trial. Instead he called three other jailhouse informants. 17 All three had
been defense witnesses at Thompson's trial where the prosecutor
objected to their testimony.18 Yet, as the witnesses left the stand in
Thompson's trial, the prosecutor subpoenaed them for Leitch's trial. 19
The prosecutor relied heavily on these witnesses to establish Leitch's
previous threats toward Fleischli, his violent disposition, and that
However, shortly after Fink incriminated Thompson his parole hold was dropped
and he was released from jail on the basis of favorable information provided by law
enforcement officials to the parole board. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1054.
14. Id. at 1056.
15. People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 96 (1988).
16. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1055-57.
17. Id. at 1056.
18. Id. at 1056.
19. Id.
5
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Leitch was "the only one with any motive" for killing Fleischli.2 ° The
jury found Leitch guilty only of second degree murder, and the judge
sentenced him to fifteen years to life.2'
In April of 1988, the California Supreme Court affirmed
Thompson's conviction and sentence.22 The Court did not address the
prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories as a form of
misconduct. Thompson then sought habeas relief in federal court.
Based on Thompson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted relief
on the rape conviction and on the rape special circumstance,
invalidating the death sentence.23 In response to Thompson's claim
that he had been prejudiced by the prosecution's use of inconsistent
theories at his and Leitch's trials, the District Court found that "the
trials differed mainly in emphasis" and any error did not require
reversal.24 A Ninth Circuit panel then reversed the District Court's
ruling on ineffective assistance of counsel, reinstating the rape
conviction and death sentence.25 The panel also denied Thompson's
petition for rehearing and his suggestion for a hearing en banc.26 In
regards to the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, the panel agreed with
the District Court that the prosecutor had not used inconsistent
theories, only theories with differing emphases.27
The U.S. Supreme Court then denied Thompson's petition for
certiorari in June 1997, and shortly thereafter the Ninth Circuit issued
a mandate denying all habeas relief.28 The State of California then set
a date for Thompson's execution for August 5, 1997.29
20. Id. at 1056-57. This is a direct quote from the prosecutor's closing
argument in Leitch's trial. Id.
21. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 544 (1998). Leitch's sentence is
reported in the slip opinion from his habeas case. Leitch v. Marshall, 2008 WL
2001941 at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2008).
22. People v. Thompson, 753 P.2d 37 (Cal. 1988).
23. See Thompson, 523 U.S. at 545.
24. Id.
25. Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358, 1364-71 (9th Cir. 1996).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Thompson v. Calderon, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997); Thompson v. Calderon, 122
F.3d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1997).
29. Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 1997).
378 [Vol. 45
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On August 3, 1997, two days before the execution, the Ninth
Circuit acting en banc recalled its previous mandate denying habeas
relief and reversed Thompson's rape conviction, the rape special
circumstances, and death sentence.30 The court explained that because
of a procedural misunderstanding within the court, no en banc call had
been made or voted on before the mandate was issued.31 A majority of
the en banc court then held that the prosecution's pursuit of
fundamentally inconsistent theories in the separate trials of Thompson
and Leitch violated Thompson's due process rights and that
Thompson's death sentence, based on these inconsistent theories,
could not stand.32
Within hours of the Ninth Circuit order, the State of California
filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. The
petition was granted, and on April 29, 1998, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.33 The Supreme Court held
that the Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to recall its mandate on
a clerical error, thus precluding the court from considering the
underlying issues of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective
assistance of counsel. 34 Thomas Thompson was subsequently
executed on July 14, 1998.
31
Despite Thompson's execution, the Ninth Circuit en banc opinion
in the Thompson case established the proposition that a prosecutor's
use of inconsistent factual theories may present a due process
30. Id. at 1059.
31. Id. at 1049.
32. Id. at 1055. The en banc court also reinstated the District Court's finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1054. In this decision to recall the mandate at
the last minute, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Thompson was in no way
responsible for the "lateness of the hour." Id. at 1049. The court had noticed its
clerical error some time before the execution was scheduled, but in the interest of
comity had delayed acting until Thompson's state-court proceedings had concluded.
Id. The court stated in its opinion, "[a]lthough, in the interest of comity, we delayed
acting ... we act now because we have sua sponte concluded that the interests of
justice require us to afford Thompson the en banc process we should have initiated
immediately after the panel's decision." Id. at 1049.
33. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 549 (1998).
34. Id. at 566.
35. Eric Bailey, California and the West: Inmate Said Goodbyes, then Died,
L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at A-3.
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violation.36 In the recent case of In re Sakarias, under this same
principle, the California Supreme Court overturned Sakarias' death
sentence. 37 This case must be considered alongside the Thompson case
to appreciate the gravity of allowing Thompson's execution to
proceed despite the substantial misconduct involved.
Peter Sakarias and Tauno Waidla were jointly charged with the
murder of Viivi Piirisild. 38 After Sakarias was found incompetent to
stand trial, their trials were severed and Waidla was tried first.39 At his
trial, the prosecutor presented evidence to support his theory that
Waidla was the dominant figure in the attack and that he was the one
who delivered the "death blow" to the victim with a hatchet. 40 The
jury convicted Waidla and voted for death.41
Months later, at Sakarias' trial, the prosecutor presented a
different theory of the crime. This time he argued that Sakarias had
acted independently and co-equally in perpetrating the crime and that
it was Sakarias who had ultimately killed Piirisild with the hatchet
blade, not Waidla. Sakarias, like Waidla, was convicted and sentenced
to death.42
On automatic appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions and the sentences, but issued an Order to Show Cause in
response to Sakarias' and Waidla's claims of prosecutorial
misconduct. In response, the Attorney General acknowledged that the
prosecutor had argued inconsistent theories, but denied that he had
done so intentionally or knowingly, contending that the death
sentences should stand despite the inconsistent theories.43
The California Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the
prosecutor had intentionally presented factually inconsistent theories
of the crime at the separate trials and that he had deliberately
manipulated the evidence introduced at each trial to match the theory
36. See In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d 931, 942 (Cal. 2005).
37. Id. at 947-48.
38. Id. at 936.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 934.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 937.
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being presented.44 Citing the en banc Ninth Circuit opinion in
Thompson, the California Supreme Court found this action to be a due
process violation requiring the reversal of Sakarias' death sentence.
The Court stated:
the prosecutor's unjustified use of inconsistent and irreconcilable
factual theories to convict two people of a crime only one could
have committed, or to obtain harsher sentences for both on the
basis of an act only one could have committed, violates due process
because in those circumstances the state has necessarily convicted
or sentenced a person on a false factual basis. 4
5
Interestingly, while the Court found the prosecutor's actions to
have been "intentional" and "in bad faith," 46 the Court never explicitly
labeled them as "misconduct." Moreover, even after reversing the
death sentence of Sakarias, the Court upheld Waidla's conviction and
death sentence, ruling that the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories
had not prejudiced the result of his trial given the "great weight of
evidence available" against him. 47 In sum, the Court concluded that
the evidence more strongly supported the theory that Waidla was the
actual killer, not Sakarias. In addition, it appears the prosecutor in this
case has never been disciplined for the misconduct. Using publicly
available records, we were able to identify the prosecutor in the
Sakarias case. An on-line search of the State Bar records reveals that
he has "no public record of discipline" though he was suspended for
six months for failure to pay his Bar dues.4 s
The California Supreme Court's ruling in In re Sakarias
dramatically highlights the injustice of allowing the execution of
Thompson to proceed despite the serious misconduct in the case. The
prosecutor in the Thompson case, as in the Sakarias case, manipulated
the evidence presented to the jury, utterly distorting the fact finding
44. Id. at 944-50.
45. Id. at 947 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 944.
47. Id. at 950.
48. Member records may be searched at the State Bar of California website.
State Bar of California, Attorney Search, http://members.calbar.ca.gov/search/
member.aspx. This search was conducted on July 10, 2007. We have not included in
this article the names of prosecutors that were not publicly identified by the court.
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process and undermining the legitimacy of the entire proceeding.
Indeed, as a result of the prosecutor's intentional manipulation of the
evidence, the State of California may very well have executed an
individual who legally should not have been sentenced to death.
Moreover, in both the Thompson case and the cases of Sakarias
and Waidla, it appears that the misconduct was motivated specifically
by the prosecutor's desire to secure a death sentence, not just a
conviction. In all three cases, the prosecutor could have secured a
conviction without manipulating the evidence and misleading the jury.
Securing a death sentence, however, was another matter. In each case,
by presenting evidence that pointed to the defendant as the person
who actually committed the killing, each prosecutor greatly increased
the likelihood that the jury would ultimately vote for death. These
cases thus illustrate both the unique pressures on prosecutors in death
penalty cases that may lead to misconduct and the unique risks, as
prosecutors may easily manipulate the evidence to increase the
chances of a death sentence. Further, the contrasting results-
execution of Thomspon, relief for Sakarias, and a finding of "harmless
error" for Waidla--demonstrate that the same type of misconduct
leads to dramatically different results.
THE CASE OF MANNY BABBITT
Often, though, it is not evidence that prosecutors manipulate but
the fears and emotions of the jury. The Babbitt case is one example.49
There is no doubt that Manuel ("Manny") Babbitt was responsible for
the death of Leah Schendel. There is also no doubt that Babbitt
suffered from severe mental illness. As a result of both prosecutorial
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel, the jury may have
been substantially misled about the nature of this illness and its legal
consequences. Thus, doubt remains as to whether the execution of
Manny Babbitt was appropriate.
Manny Babbitt was a Vietnam War veteran who suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder.50 On December 18, 1980, he broke into
the home of seventy-eight-year-old Leah Schendel.51 Surprised by
49. People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660 (1988).
50. Id. at 678-79.
51. Id. at 676-77, 724.
[Vol. 45
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Schendel, Babbitt struck her, causing her to fall to the ground.
Schendel suffered from coronary heart disease, and, according to a
pathologist, died after falling as a result of a heart attack brought on
by fright.52 The pathologist noted the physical blows she received
would not themselves have proven fatal and that it was only because
of the heart attack that she died.53
Manny Babbitt's own brother, Bill Babbitt, turned him in to the
police, telling them that his brother was mentally ill and needed
help. 54 The police assured Bill that Manny would receive treatment.
Instead, he was sentenced to death and ultimately executed on May 4,
1999.55
Babbitt's trial focused almost exclusively on his severe mental
illness and whether that illness should preclude execution. His
attorney called family members and two expert witnesses to describe
his behavior and explain his mental illness to the jury.
In closing arguments during the sanity phase of the trial, the
prosecutor made "unflattering" remarks about Babbitt's expert
witness, inveighed against the use of psychiatric defenses generally,
and stated or implied to the jury that a finding of insanity would result
in Babbitt going free.56 The prosecutor's comments included:
"We are letting justice be decided on the basis of how well a
psychiatrist can sell their bag of tricks," and, "they [psychiatrists]
are so vain as to think they are capable of all these magical,
mystical things they say they are capable of ....
"[W]e have a social cancer in our community now, and it is this
very process of allowing psychiatrists to come in and make their
52. Id. at 677.
53. Id.
54. Linda Grace-Kobas, Death Penalty Offers Families No Closure, Law
School Speakers Say, Cornell Chronicle, Mar 30, 2003, available at
http://www.news.cornell.edu/ChronicleiO3/3.20.03/death-penalty-forum.html
(viewed Feb 12, 2009). See also Bill Babbitt profile at http://www.mvfhr.org/
(viewed Feb 12, 2009).
55. Maria La Ganga, Babbitt is Executed After Appeals Fail, L.A. TIMES, May
4, 1999, at A-1.
56. People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d at 696-97.
57. Id. at 697.
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moral pronouncements disguised as medical opinion in the hopes of
persuading jurors to let people off the hook ....58
"I'm going to find this guy crazy and let him go home. ..."59
[Psychiatrists] are perfectly willing to come to court and absolve an
individual such as Manuel Babbitt of all criminal
responsibility.... 60
[E]very time somebody gets mad, they are free to commit any
crime they want, and they can be found not guilty by reason of
insanity. 6
1
On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court held that even
though most of the prosecutor's remarks approached misconduct and
were "skirting the edge of propriety" they were "clearly non-
prejudicial.- 62 Indeed, though the Court explicitly identified one
comment as "improper,"63 the Court concluded that "any error in the
prosecutor's single improper remark... was nonprejudicial. ' 64
To reach these conclusions the Court took three analytic steps:
first, the Court held that, when viewed in light of the testimony of the
prosecution's expert witness, the prosecutor's statements disparaging
the defense experts were based on the evidence. The Court thus held
that the prosecutor's statements went to the weight of the defense
witnesses' testimony, not to its admissibility. 65 Second, the Court
adopted a very narrow interpretation of the prosecutor's closing
argument. The Court focused on isolated clauses to reach the
conclusion that the prosecutor was not urging the jury to remove the
"social cancer" from the courtroom, but rather that he meant to argue
that the jury could not do so. 6 6 Finally, the Court held that the
58. Id. at 699.
59. Id. at 703.
60. Id. at 702.
61. Id. at 703.
62. Id. at 700.
63. Id. at 704.
64. Id. at 705.
65. Id. at 699.
66. Id. at 700.
384 [Vol. 45
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prosecutor's statements about letting the defendant "off the hook"
were not a form of misconduct because, when understood properly,
they did not refer to a physical freedom from confinement, but to a
freedom from criminal responsibility that follows a finding of
insanity. Ultimately, the Court found that, regardless, the statements
were non-prejudicial because the jury had heard testimony that a
finding of insanity would result in Babbitt being sent to a mental
institution for "an indefinite period of time."67
The Court did conclude that the prosecutor's statement, "I'm
going to find this guy crazy and let him go home," 68 was improper "to
the extent the prosecutor was suggesting that when an accused is
found insane he is let free." 69 However, the Court found that this
statement alone did not deprive Babbitt of a fair hearing and was thus
non-prejudicial.7°
Research from the Capital Jury Project has shown that a juror's
beliefs about whether the defendant will ever be eligible for release is
critical to whether that juror is likely to vote for life or death.7' The
Babbitt prosecutor misled the jury about the consequences of finding
Babbitt legally insane, manipulating their fears, in order to secure a
finding that Babbitt was eligible for death and, ultimately a death
sentence. From the outset of the trial, there was no doubt that Babbitt
would not "go free." The only question was whether he would be sent
to a state mental hospital, given a sentence of permanent
imprisonment, or sentenced to death. But the prosecutor's comments
were intended to, and likely did, make the jury believe that whether
Babbitt would "go free" depended on them, making it much more
likely that the jury would vote for death.
Further, the California Supreme Court's decision demonstrates
that, in fact, the Court is failing to provide meaningful review of this
type of misconduct. Rather than clearly articulate what is and is not
appropriate conduct for a prosecutor in this type of case, the Court
67. Id. at 706.
68. Id. at 703 (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 704.
70. Id. at 705.
71. See ScoTr SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE
DEATH PENALTY (Palgrave MacMillan) (2005) (describing years of research by the
Capital Jury Project).
13
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goes to lengths to minimize the impact of the conduct, parsing the
prosecutor's statements into isolated bits without considering the total
impact on the jury. The result is that the Court's decision likely
encourages prosecutors to continue "skirting the edge of propriety" 72
in death penalty cases. The Court is thus sending exactly the wrong
message to prosecutors. The Court, and the legal profession in
general, should demand that prosecutors maintain the highest ethical
standards in death penalty cases, and not encourage them, implicitly or
explicitly, to get away with as much as possible.
OTHER EXECUTION CASES RAISING SUBSTANTIAL MISCONDUCT
The cases of Thomas Thompson and Manny Babbitt are the two
cases of actual execution in California where prosecutorial misconduct
had a significant impact on the outcome and where the
appropriateness of the execution is most in doubt. But prosecutorial
misconduct is an issue in a significant number of death penalty cases.
Of the thirteen executions which have taken place in California since
the death penalty was reinstated in 1977, prosecutorial misconduct has
been raised as a significant issue in seven-more than half.
73
Moreover, in many of these cases we see the courts, particularly the
California Supreme Court, simply side-step the misconduct and
minimize its effect on the outcome of the trial rather than addressing
directly the appropriateness of the behavior. Consider the following
examples:
David Mason (executed August 24, 1993)-During Mason's
murder trial the prosecution improperly elicited information from
witnesses, including Mason himself. For example, on cross-
examination, the prosecutor asked Mason about evidence (firearms in
his possession at the time of arrest) that the court had specifically
excluded.74 The prosecutor also improperly elicited testimony from
witnesses regarding Mason's violence and threats of violence towards
inmates in the prison as well as information about other crimes Mason
72. People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d at 700.
73. For the full list of inmates executed in California from 1978 through 2008,
see http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/InmatesExecuted.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2009).
74. People v. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d 909, 947 (1991).
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had committed in the past.7 5 Notwithstanding; the California Supreme
Court failed to address whether these actions constituted misconduct,
concluding that the conduct was "non-prejudicial., 76
William George Bonin (executed February 23, 1996)-The
prosecutor elicited inadmissible evidence from a witness to the effect
that Bonin had admitted to other murders in addition to the four for
which he was on trial.77 The California Supreme Court observed that it
appeared that the prosecutor had elicited the testimony intentionally,
and that "the prosecutor must have known that the testimony he
elicited ... was inadmissible: that evidence was plainly irrelevant to
the issues material to the question of guilt, and had been ruled such by
the court. ' 78 However, the Supreme Court held that it need not resolve
the question of whether the prosecutor's actions were misconduct
because "we have come to the conclusion that the conduct ... could
not be deemed prejudicial., 79
Further, in closing arguments, the prosecutor made arguments
based on an erroneous understanding of the law, arguing that the
absence of evidence in mitigation was itself an aggravating factor. The
prosecutor made this argument to the jury at least six different times
during his closing argument. The California Supreme Court stated that
the prosecutor's remarks were clearly a misstatement of the law, but
held that "defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be
rejected at the threshold" because a timely objection had not been
raised by defense counsel at trial.80 The court also held that the
prosecutor's statements, though erroneous, could not be characterized
as misconduct because they were not made in "bad faith." Finally, the
court concluded the comments were non-prejudicial given the weight
75. Id. at 948-49.
76. Id. at 941. After the California Supreme Court decision, Mason waived
further appeals and volunteered for execution. Mason v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220, 1222
(9th Cir. 1993). Thus, his case was not reviewed by any federal courts. It is possible
that such a review might have reached a different conclusion about whether the
prosecutorial misconduct was prejudicial.
77. People v. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d. 659, 680 (1988).
78. Id. at 689.
79. Id. at 690.
80. Id. at 701.
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of aggravating evidence against Bonin and the fact that the court had
instructed the jurors properly.81
Darrell Keith Rich (executed March 15, 2000)-In closing
arguments, the prosecutor urged the jury to consider the "strong
evidence" that two of the victims had been raped during their murder
as an aggravating factor.82 The prosecutor made this argument even
though earlier the same jury had found that the victims were not
murdered during the commission of a rape. 83 In essence, the
prosecutor urged the jury to consider something as an aggravating
factor when he had not previously been able to prove the conduct
occurred. On appeal, the Attorney General's office admitted that this
conduct was "error," but argued that it was "harmless." 84 The
California Supreme Court agreed, concluding that "the improper
argument was harmless." 8
5
Stanley Williams (executed December 13, 2005)-Williams
claimed that the prosecutor "impermissibly exercised peremptory
challenges" in a racially discriminatory manner, excluding three
African-Americans from the jury "in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause." 86 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed this claim,
concluding that even though "a pattern of strikes against African-
Americans provides support for an inference of discrimination,"
Williams' pleadings were factually insufficient because they did not
include the proportion of African-Americans excluded.87 On en banc
review by the Ninth Circuit, thirteen judges dissented from the denial
of relief, finding sufficient evidence to warrant further review of the
claim that the prosecutor had dismissed jurors based on racial bias. 88
Clarence Ray Allen (executed January 19, 2006)-The
prosecution failed to disclose evidence that would have impeached the
credibility of two of the prosecution's key witnesses. 89 For example,
81. Id. at 702.
82. People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1122 (1988).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 583 (9th Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 584.
88. Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005).
89. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 997 (9th Cir. 2003).
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the prosecution failed to disclose a letter written by one witness' wife
instructing him how to change his testimony at a separate trial.90 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's actions were
not in violation of Brady v. Maryland because they did not deprive
Allen of a fair trial or undermine confidence in the outcome of the
trial given that "the testimony of [the witnesses] was substantially
impeached" through other available evidence.91
In closing arguments, the prosecutor described to the jury what he
thought Allen's victims would "say from beyond the grave." 92 The
prosecutor also compared Allen to Adolf Hitler and accused him of
conspiring with his counsel to retaliate against one of the trial
witnesses. 93 The Ninth Circuit held that this last statement was
undoubtedly misconduct; 94 however, the court minimized the
importance or effect of the statements, concluding that the statements
were non-prejudicial. 95
COMPARISON WITH DEATH PENALTY CASES
REVERSED FOR MISCONDUCT
It is useful to compare these cases of actual execution-in which
substantial prosecutorial misconduct was raised but relief denied-
with those death penalty cases in which relief was granted in whole or
in part because of misconduct. 96 The sharp contrast in outcomes
between the cases of Thompson, Sakarias, and Waidla has already
been addressed.97 In particular, the difference in outcomes between
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1016.
94. Id. at 997-98.
95. Id.
96. We do not consider cases where the court found misconduct, but reversed
the conviction or death sentence for other reasons such as incorrect jury instructions.
See, e.g., People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 287-88 (1985).
97. Compare Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997), with In re
Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th 140 (2005) (showing that despite the same finding by courts
that the prosecutors committed misconduct by arguing inconsistent theories of
culpability to different juries in cases with co-defendants tried separately, one
defendant was executed, one had his death sentence reversed, while a third remains
on death row).
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Sakarias (conviction and death sentence reversed) and Waidla (death
sentence affirmed), despite the fact that the cases involved the
identical intentional misconduct by the prosecutor, illustrates that the
results of post-conviction review have little correlation to the severity
of the misconduct. Indeed, the difference in results in these two cases
appears to reflect nothing more than the California Supreme Court's
own belief about who the real killer was. 98 Apart from cases reversed
because of racial bias during jury selection and one unique case,
People v. Hill,99 the other cases in which death sentences were
reversed also appear to have rested on the courts' assessments of the
strength of the evidence.
Two California death sentences have been reversed because of
racial bias in jury selection, People v. Silva, l00 and People v.
Fuentes.a0 1 Unlike other claims of prosecutorial misconduct, harmless
error analysis does not apply to claims of racial bias in jury selection
and prejudice need not be established for the behavior to be
considered misconduct. As the Court observed in Silva, "[t]he
exclusion by peremptory challenge of a single juror on the basis of
race or ethnicity is an error of constitutional magnitude requiring
reversal." 10 2 This appears to be the only type of prosecutorial
misconduct that results in reversal without requiring any showing of
an impact on the outcome of the case.
Using publicly available records, we were able to identify the
prosecutor in the Silva case.10 3 An on-line search of the State Bar
records reveals that he has "no public record of discipline."' 0 4 We
were not able to identify the bar record for the prosecutor in the
Fuentes case because the name listed for the prosecutor is too
common.
98. Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th at 168.
99. People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800 (1998).
100. People v. Silva, 25 Cal. 4th 345, 385-386 (2001).
101. People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d 707, 711 (1991).
102. See Silva, 25 Cal. 4th at 386.
103. The names of the prosecutors for each case are available in public records
of the trial including transcripts and minute orders.
104. State Bar of California, Attorney Search, http://members.calbar.ca.govl
search/member.aspx. This search was performed on July 10, 2007.
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Turning to the other cases of misconduct, the case of People v.
Hill stands out.105 As the California Supreme Court ultimately
concluded, the prosecutor in Hill "committed serious, blatant and
continuous misconduct at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial."'10 6
The Court described the "most egregious" examples of misconduct
during guilt phase as "(i) her patent misstatements of the facts in
closing argument ... ; (ii) her improper references to alleged facts
outside the record . . .; (iii) her misstatements of the law; and (iv) her
threat to charge a defense witness with perjury should he testify for
the defense."'0 7
Elsewhere, the Court described the prosecutor's conduct as
"constant and outrageous misconduct," amounting to a "pervasive
campaign to mislead the jury on key legal points," including
"unceasing denigration of defense counsel before the jury .... 108 The
Court then stated, "[a]lthough we might conclude any single instance
of misconduct was harmless standing alone, we cannot ignore the
overall prejudice to defendant's fair trial rights caused by [the
prosecutor's behavior]." 10 9 Moreover, the Court noted that three Court
of Appeal decisions found this same prosecutor to have committed
misconduct in other cases.1 10
The Hill case stands out both because of the egregious and
pervasive nature of the prosecutor's misconduct but also because the
California Supreme Court reversed the conviction largely because of
this misconduct. It also appears to be the only case in which the Court
takes "judicial notice" of prior acts of misconduct, over the objection
of the Attorney General. Yet, a search of the State Bar records reveals
that the prosecutor still has "no public record of discipline."''
105. People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800 (1998).
106. Id. at 844.
107. Id. at 836.
108. Id. at 845.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 847.
111. The California Supreme Court identified the prosecutor in Hill as Rosalie
Morton. A search of member records performed July 9, 2007, shows that Rosalie L.
Morton State Bar number 36924, of Sherman Oaks, has "no public record of
discipline." State Bar of California, Attorney Search, http://members.calbar.ca.gov/
search/member.aspx.
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Apart from the cases reversed because of racial bias in jury
selection, Hill and Sakarias, the California Supreme Court has
reversed only one other death penalty case because of prosecutorial
misconduct since reinstatement of the death penalty in 1977: People v.
Quartermain. 112 In Quartermain, the defendant agreed to a pre-trial
interview with the prosecutor under the condition that his statements
would not be used during trial. 1 3 When the defendant testified, the
prosecutor used his pre-trial statement to impeach him.1 4 The
California Supreme Court found this to be a violation of due
process.1 15 The Court concluded that this was not harmless error
because the evidence against the defendant was largely circumstantial,
making his credibility critical to the outcome of the case.11 6 We were
able to identify the prosecutor in this case and he also has "no public
record of discipline."'' 17
Three other California death penalty cases have been reversed by
the Ninth Circuit as a result of prosecutorial misconduct: Sandoval v.
Woodford,'18 Hayes v. Brown,119 and Silva v. Brown.120 In Sandoval,
the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument quoted biblical
passages which exhorted jurors to follow the "higher authority" of
God, encouraging them to disregard the legal requirements for finding
in favor of death.121 The California Supreme Court found this to be
error but harmless. 122 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the misconduct
was prejudicial given that "this [was] not a case where the evidence
112. People v. Quartermain, 941 P.2d 788, 797-98 (Cal. 1997). See also People
v. Purvis, 384 P.2d 424, 443-44 (Cal. 1963); People v. Love, 366 P.2d 33, 40 (Cal.
1961) (death penalty cases reversed for prosecutorial misconduct under prior death
penalty statute).
113. Quartermain, 941 P.2d at 797.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 799.
116. Id. at 800.
117. See supra note 48.
118. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 776-77 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 943 (2001).
119. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978-80(9th Cir. 2004).
120. Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 992 (9th Cir. 2005).
121. Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 776-77.
122. People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 882 (Cal. 1992).
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overwhelmingly supported the jury's [death] verdict."'1 23 The Court
noted the length of jury deliberations (three days), the lack of
overwhelming guilt evidence, the considerable amount of mitigating
evidence, and that the jury reported itself deadlocked six to six shortly
before finding in favor of death.1 24 We could not identify the
prosecutor in this case and thus do not know if discipline was
imposed.
In Hayes, the prosecutor and the attorney representing a witness
who testified against Hayes reached an agreement prior to trial that the
witness' pending felony charges would be dismissed as a result of his
testimony. This deal was not disclosed to the defense attorney, judge,
or jury, and the prosecutor allowed the witness to falsely testify that
he was receiving no such benefit. 125 The District Court concluded that
the prosecutor "knowingly presented false evidence to the jury and
made false representations to the trial judge," but found the error
harmless. 26 The Ninth Circuit found the error prejudicial because the
witness' testimony was critical to the special circumstance finding that
made Hayes eligible for the death penalty and thus reversed. 127 The
prosecutor in the Hayes case is now a judge. His State Bar discipline
record is not available and an on-line search of the California
Commission on Judicial Performance does not list him among those
judges who have been disciplined.' 28
In Silva, the prosecution also entered into a secret plea agreement
with its star witness, agreeing that the witness would not have to
undergo a psychiatric examination until after he testified. 29 The
prosecutor failed to disclose this deal to the defense, the judge or the
jury, nor was the jury informed that the witness might not have been
competent to testify. The district court concluded that this conduct did
not violate Brady because the information was not "material."' 30 The
123. Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 778.
124. Id. at 779.
125. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 978-80.
126. Id. at 978.
127. Id. at 986.
128. Search performed July 10, 2007. Records of the California Commission
on Judicial Performance may be searched at http://cjp.ca.gov/index.php?id=9.
129. Silva, 416 F.3d at 986. The witness, who was directly involved in the
charged murders, had suffered severe brain damage years earlier.
130. Id. at 985.
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Ninth Circuit found the hidden deal to be material because the
witness's testimony "was crucial to the State's prosecution of Silva for
murder," as he was "the only witness [who] identified Silva as [the]
killer."'' The Ninth Circuit thus reversed the conviction, having
previously reversed the death sentence because of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 132 We were able to identify the prosecutor in the
Silva case and he too, like all others identified, has "no public record
of discipline." 
133
With the exception of Hill and the cases reversed for racial bias,
the outcome in all of these cases where prosecutorial misconduct led
to actual reversal of either the conviction or death sentence appears to
depend solely on the court's assessment of the strength of the
evidence. In all five cases-Quartermain, Sakarias, Sandoval, Hayes,
and Silva-the reversing courts cite either the lack of evidence or the
closeness of the case as the reason the misconduct was prejudicial.
The nature, severity or intentionality of the conduct does not appear
relevant. Indeed, the misconduct shown in some of these cases of
reversal is arguably less significant than the misconduct in some of the
actual execution cases. For example, the prosecutor's argument in
Babbitt-encouraging jurors to believe that their verdict might result
in Babbitt going free-arguably is more prejudicial than the Biblical
passages quoted by the prosecutor in Sandoval. Likewise, the
intentional manipulation of evidence in the Thompson case is arguably
more prejudicial than in the Sakarias case; in the latter, the defendant
would still be eligible for death under either of the prosecution's
theories, 134 whereas in the former, the defendant was not eligible for
death under the prosecutor's theory at the co-defendant's trial. Such
inconsistent results in the most serious of cases-cases where the
defendant's life literally hangs in the balance-demonstrate the urgent
need for reform.
131. Id. at 987.
132. Id. at 992.
133. See supra note 49.
134. Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th at 171-79 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
despite the prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories, the evidence on the
record would still have justified Sakarias' death sentence given his involvement in
the gruesome murder of Viivi Piirisild).
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LESSONS TO BE DRAWN
We draw five lessons from this review of prosecutorial
misconduct in actual execution cases and death penalty cases that
resulted in reversal because of misconduct:
1) There are particular forms of misconduct that are likely to
occur in death penalty cases;
2) Death penalty cases present unique risks because of the
pressures to engage in misconduct to secure the death
sentence and not just the conviction;
3) There is a unique risk in these cases that misconduct will
influence the jury on the issue of sentence;
4) Post-conviction review largely fails to address the problem
of misconduct in death penalty cases; and
5) Currently, there are no remedies, sanctions, or institutional
efforts that will effectively maintain the professional
responsibility of prosecutors in death penalty cases.
First, there are particular forms of misconduct that are likely to
occur in death penalty cases. As in non-death penalty cases,
prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases frequently takes the
form of racial bias in jury selection, 135 improperly eliciting facts or
information that have been or should have been excluded, 136 and
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense.' 37 But
additionally, three forms of misconduct appear particularly likely to
occur in death penalty cases:
a) Manipulating the evidence and theory of the case to make
the defendant the more culpable party;' 38
b) Misstating the law in order to mislead jurors about the
legal requirements for finding the defendant deserves death or
135. See text accompanying and discussion of Williams, supra note 86; Silva,
supra note 100; Funtes, supra note 101.
136. See text accompanying and discussion of Mason, supra note 74; Bonin,
supra note 77; Quartermain, supra note 112.
137. See text accompanying and discussion of Allen, supra note 89; Hayes,
supra note 125; Benjamin Silva, supra note 129.
138. See text accompanying and discussion of Thompson, Sakarias, and
Waidla, supra notes 8-48.
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about the consequences of voting for a sentence less than
death; 139 and
c) Inflaming the passions of the jurors to make them more
likely to vote for death. 140
These forms of misconduct illustrate point number two above: all
are directed specifically to increasing the chances that the jury will
vote for death, not merely that the jury will convict the defendant.
Prosecutors in death penalty cases face intense pressure not just to
secure a conviction but also to secure a death sentence. Generally,
these are high profile cases with close public scrutiny. In addition,
every prosecutor is aware that his or her office has devoted substantial
resources specifically to attaining a death sentence, not just a
conviction. The role of the prosecutor in a death penalty case goes far
beyond merely presenting the evidence to the jurors and allowing
them to choose the appropriate sentence. Rather, prosecutors advocate
for death. Thus, prosecutors generally consider it a "loss" if the jury
votes for life and a "win" if the jury chooses death.14 1
Moreover, this kind of misconduct is particularly pernicious in the
context of death penalty cases. In most criminal trials, the jury must
decide only what the facts are and whether the facts demonstrate the
crime charged. But in death penalty cases, jurors must make the
utterly subjective decision whether an individual should live or die.
Jurors' answers to this question will undoubtedly be affected by
inflammatory evidence and emotional appeals, regardless of any
curative instructions from the court. In addition, research shows that
the majority of jurors do not understand the instructions in death
penalty cases. 142 Inaccurate legal arguments are likely to substantially
mislead the jury about its role and/or the consequences of its choices.
139. See text accompanying and discussion of Babbitt, supra note 50-72;
Bonin, supra note 77; Sandoval, supra note 121.
140. See text accompanying and discussion of Rich, supra note 82; Allen,
supra note 89; Sandoval, supra note 121.
141. Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the
Death Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates' Campaigning On Capital
Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 941, 947 (1994) ("When a prosecutor touts the
number of defendants she has sent to death row, the prosecutor is saying the same
thing: that it is something to take pride in and it is something that the prosecutor had
a hand in, not something she was handed.").
142. See SUNDBY, supra note 71.
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Thus, death penalty cases present unique risks for prosecutorial
misconduct.
Further, our analysis of the execution cases in California also
demonstrates that post-conviction review largely fails to address the
problem of prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases (point
four). In particular, the application of "harmless error" analysis to
prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases means that, almost
universally, the courts only reverse the judgment if the evidence is
weak. With the single exception of the Hill case, even egregious and
intentional misconduct does not necessarily result in reversal, even
when the prosecutor's conduct substantially distorted that fact finding
process, as in Thompson and Waidla.
Moreover, courts sometimes fail to even address whether
misconduct has occurred, using "harmless error" analysis to avoid the
question or finding the issue waived because defense counsel failed to
object. 143 Indeed, some highly questionable behavior by prosecutors is
not legally considered "misconduct" unless prejudice is shown.1 44
This creates a legal system where prosecutors can engage in virtually
any behavior, despite the ethical concerns raised by that behavior, as
long as the reviewing judges feel there was enough evidence to justify
the conviction or the defense fails to object. In practice, this failure to
even address whether misconduct has occurred can only encourage
prosecutors to "skirt the edge of propriety."'1 45 This is particularly
inappropriate in death penalty cases, both because of the high stakes
and because the sentencing decision can be so easily influenced by
misconduct.
143. See People v. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d 909 at 947 (1991); People v. Bonin, 46
Cal. 3d 659, 688-89 (1988); People v. Cudjo, 6 Cal. 4th 585, 625-26 (1993), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 850 (1994) (holding the argument "improper" but harmless);
People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1114 (2005) (holding misconduct harmless). See also
Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1167, 1181-83 (1995) (noting the
increasing tendency of courts to use the harmless error rule to avoid reaching
difficult issues in a case, including prosecutorial error, by evading the issue and
stating that any error that may have occurred was harmless).
144. People v. Stevens, 41 Cal. 4th 182, 208, 211 (2007) (holding there was no
"misconduct" because the argument did not in fact "mislead" the jury and therefore
no prejudice was shown).
145. People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 700 (1988).
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Finally, there currently are no remedies for misconduct or
institutional efforts that will effectively maintain the professional
responsibility of prosecutors in death penalty cases (point five). Only
reversal of judgment results in mandatory reporting of prosecutors to
the State Bar for misconduct.'4 6 As a result, almost no prosecutors are
even reported for misconduct in death penalty cases, even when the
conduct was intentional. Even those cases that fall under the
mandatory reporting rule do not seem to result in sanctions. Indeed,
we were able to verify that, out of eight death penalty cases reversed
for prosecutorial misconduct, five prosecutors have "no public record
of discipline," and one prosecutor is a sitting judge. The Hill case is
particularly troubling because the prosecutor in that case was allowed
to try a death penalty case even after reviewing courts found that she
committed misconduct in three other cases. Even more shocking, she
has never been publicly disciplined, despite having committed
misconduct in four cases, including a death penalty case, and despite
severe reprimand by the California Supreme Court in its decision.
Civil lawsuits against prosecutors for misconduct are also an
ineffective remedy. Immunity protects prosecutors in most cases, even
when their conduct is intentional and egregious.147 Indeed, Professor
Margaret Z. Johns has criticized the doctrine of prosecutorial
immunity, stating, "[tihe justification for absolute immunity is that
civil rights litigation will chill the prosecutorial function and unduly
burden the government. But the evidence of prosecutorial misconduct
resulting in wrongful convictions suggests that we have sacrificed the
integrity of our criminal justice system for the sake of efficiency."'' 48
Moreover, there are no visible institutional efforts to encourage
prosecutors to adhere to ethical standards in death penalty cases.
Rather than simply relying on sanctions, the Judicial Council and/or
the State Bar could take proactive steps to encourage ethical conduct.
The legal profession as a whole has an ethical duty to promote
professional responsibility, particularly in death penalty cases-a duty
that has been largely ignored.
146. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068 (West 2007).
147. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005
BYU L. REV. 53, 82 (2005).
148. Id. at 125 (footnote omitted).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
This article considers only a small sample of death penalty cases.
It does not address the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in any
of the more than 600 death penalty cases in California where post-
conviction review is not final. 149 Nor does it consider the death
penalty cases where prosecutorial misconduct was discovered before
trial, resulting in a sentence less than death. 150 Even this small sample,
however, demonstrates the need for reform.
First and foremost, the "harmless error" analysis simply should
not be applied to evaluate misconduct in death penalty cases. When
the prosecution seeks the ultimate sanction of death, it should be
expected to follow the rules scrupulously. Further, because the
assessment of whether death is appropriate is so subjective, it is
simply unrealistic to believe that a reviewing court can determine
whether the outcome would have been the same without the
misconduct. Currently, meaningful review is limited to those cases
where the court believes the evidence was weak.1 51 But when it comes
to life or death decisions, every defendant deserves a fair trial, even
the guilty.
We note, however, that the harmless error rule is mandated by the
California State Constitution and federal law. 152 In practice, the
application of the rule is determined by case law emanating from the
California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, the
149. The total number of death row inmates in California may be found on the
website of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports-Research/docs/CondemnednmateSummary.pdf
(last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
150. In one death penalty case from Los Angeles, a prosecutor altered the notes
of an interview and gave only the altered notes to defense counsel. Caitlin Liu,
Prosecutor Admits Altering Evidence in Murder Case, L.A. TIMES at A4 (Feb. 14,
2002). Once the misconduct was discovered, the judge declared a mistrial and the
prosecution dropped its pursuit of the death penalty. Id. In another case from
Alameda County, the prosecutor used racial slurs to describe the defendant. As a
result, the prosecutor was removed from the case which ended in a verdict of life
without parole. Information provided by Assistant Public Defender Charles Denton.
151. See discussion infra note 41, and 95-108.
152. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967).
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harmless error rule is unlikely to change anytime soon. We turn,
therefore, to three more promising areas of reform.
The California Rules of Professional Conduct should be amended
to specify the ethical standards that apply to the prosecution of death
penalty cases.
It is odd that while medical professionals have debated the ethics
of doctor involvement in executions for more than twenty years, 53 the
legal profession has never addressed the unique ethical issues that
arise in death penalty cases. A search of the cannons of professional
responsibility reveals no specific rules addressing death penalty cases
for either the defense or the prosecution. 154 Further, a search of
scholarly articles reveals only one article even remotely related to the
issue of prosecutorial ethics in death penalty cases. 155 This article
addresses whether or not candidates for office may ethically "tout"
their records of securing death sentences.1 56 This near failure of the
legal community to discuss the ethical issues raised by death penalty
cases is unacceptable.
The Rules of Professional Responsibility should address, at a
minimum, these areas:
153. CODE OF MED. ETHICS § E-2.06 (American Med. Ass'n 1980), available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8419.html.
154. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY; MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1983); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & SCOTT S. DZIENKOWSKI,
THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2007) (none make
mention of the ethical issues that arise in prosecuting death penalty cases); see also
Natasha Minsker, Death-Penalty Work Tests Lawyers' Ethics, DAILY JOURNAL, Oct.
24, 2006, available at https://ww.aclunc.org/news/opinion/death-penalty-work_
testsjlawyers%27ethics.shtml.
155. Bresler, supra note 141. Almost the only ethical issue related to the death
penalty addressed in law reviews or secondary sources is whether a defense attorney
should continue to represent a defendant who wishes to volunteer for execution. See,
e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on Lawyers' Ethics and Death Row
Volunteers, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 795 (2002); C. Lee Harrington, Mental
Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making: Death Row Volunteering and
Euthanasia, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1109 (2004); J.C. Oleson, Swilling
Hemlock: The Legal Ethics of Defending a Client Who Wishes to Volunteer for
Execution, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 147 (2006). One article also discusses what
constitutes ethical conduct in defending a death penalty case. See Victor L. Streib,
Would You Lie to Save Your Client's Life? Ethics and Effectiveness in Defending
Against Death, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 405 (2004).
156. Bresler, supra note 141.
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The Decision to Charge Death
* Prosecutors should not charge death for the purpose of
securing a plea bargain to a lesser sentence.
* Prosecutors should not let race, gender, or economic status
of either the defendant or the victim influence the decision
of whether to seek death.
Pre-trial Conduct
* Prosecutors should provide open-file discovery and
scrupulously disclose to the defense any and all
information that might be beneficial to the defense, either
during the guilt or the penalty phase.
" Prosecutors should not interfere with efforts by the defense
team to speak to the family members of the victim or any
potential witnesses, including law enforcement.
" Prosecutors should keep an open mind throughout the
process and be willing to reconsider the decision to seek
death.
Trial Conduct
" Prosecutors should never manipulate the evidence or the
theory of the case for the purpose of securing a finding
that the defendant is eligible for death or to secure a death
sentence.
* Prosecutors should not seek to mislead the jury about the
legal requirements for finding in favor of death or about
the legal consequences of their decision not to find for
death.
" Prosecutors should not inflame the passions or fear of the
jury to secure a death sentence.
" Prosecutors should scrupulously follow the general ethical
rules regarding conduct in trial, including rules against
inappropriate disclosure of evidence and against
disparaging the defense.
Post-trial Conduct
o Prosecutors should provide open-file discovery to post-
conviction defense counsel in death penalty cases.
Behavior in Public
o Prosecutors should refrain from public comments that
could prejudice the defendant in a death penalty case.
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0 Prosecutors should not tout death sentences as "wins."
On a more fundamental level, we should encourage a conversation
within the legal community about whether it is appropriate for
prosecutors to "advocate" for death. Given the unique power of
attorneys in our society, and of prosecutors in particular, we as a legal
community should ask whether this is appropriate. Prosecutors should
view their role in death penalty prosecutions more as neutral
conveyors to the jury, presenting the facts for the jury's assessment,
without investing themselves in the outcome. This could help
eliminate the pressure to win that often drives prosecutors to bend and
break the rules. More broadly, we should ask whether this sort of
change would better reflect the values and ethics of the professional
legal community. These are just some of the issues that attorneys and
ethicists should consider. Regardless of the outcome, the conversation
is long overdue.
The California Business and Professions Code section 6086.7
should be modified to require a court to notify the State Bar whenever
misconduct has occurred in a death penalty case, regardless of
whether the judgment is impacted.
As has already been addressed at length in this article, the current
rule largely prevents effective enforcement of the ethical requirements
in death penalty cases. Every misconduct should have a consequence,
regardless of how guilty the defendant appears to be to the reviewing
court. In addition, the California Supreme Court should always
address whether the prosecutor's actions constitute misconduct, even
if the defense failed to object or the error is deemed harmless. By
failing to even address whether the behavior constitutes misconduct,
the Court abdicates its responsibility to provide guidance to attorneys
about what is appropriate and even encourages prosecutors to continue
to push the rules to the limits.
But more fundamentally, we should consider whether discipline
of prosecutors should continue to be the responsibility of the State Bar
or whether a new mechanism is needed. As should be more than
evident from our review, even when egregious misconduct results in
reversal, discipline does not always ensue. Professor Bennett
Gershman, a former prosecutor and leading expert on prosecutorial
misconduct, has recommended removing oversight of prosecutors
from the State Bar and vesting it instead in a quasi-judicial agency
similar to the Commission on Judicial Performance which investigates
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allegations of judicial misconduct.' 57 We agree with Professor
Gershman.
Finally, the state of the law on prosecutorial misconduct is itself
confusing and may even prevent implementation of the reform
recommended here. As noted, some forms of questionable, unethical
behavior by prosecutors are not legally labeled as "misconduct" unless
there was prejudice to the defendant. As a result, in some cases,
behavior is not considered misconduct because of "overwhelming
evidence of guilt," or because the jury was "not misled," whereas in
other cases the exact same behavior may be labeled misconduct. Thus,
there is also a need to clarify what is and is not ethical behavior by
prosecutors, regardless of its impact on the trial.
Existing discovery policies and procedures must be modified to
ensure compliance with the requirements of the Constitution.
Open-file discovery should be the norm in death penalty cases.
When the state seeks death, it should never have anything to hide. The
prosecution's failure to provide full discovery results in questionable
death sentences, and ultimately, years and years of additional
litigation. Open-file discovery rules would provide full protection,
ensuring both the rights of the defendant and the integrity of the
process. Legislation should be adopted making this mandatory, rather
than allowing individual offices or even individual prosecutors to
establish their own policies.
CONCLUSION
This article has focused on the examples of misconduct in death
penalty cases; we have not attempted to address whether this
misconduct is "rampant," "common," or "rare." Such labels are beside
the point. As the Ninth Circuit observed,
Our criminal justice system depends on the integrity of the
attorneys who present their cases to the jury. When even a single
conviction is obtained through perjurious or deceptive means, the
entire foundation of our system of justice is weakened. 158
157. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 393,
454-55 (1992) (advocating the creation of a "prosecutorial conduct commission").
158. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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This is even more true in the context of the death penalty. As the
Third Circuit has stated,
The sentencing phase of a death penalty trial is one of the most
critical proceedings in our criminal justice system .... Because of
the surpassing importance of the jury's penalty determination, a
prosecutor has a heightened duty to refrain from conduct designed
to inflame the sentencing jury's passions and prejudices.159
Even one execution tainted by prosecutorial misconduct casts a
shadow over the integrity of California's criminal justice system. Our
review indicates that the problem of prosecutorial misconduct in death
penalty cases cannot be marginalized to "isolated cases." Systemic
problems exist and systemic solutions are needed. If the State of
California is to continue executing people in the name of the People,
then we must hold our public officers, the prosecutors, to the highest
standards.
159. Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1541 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 898 (1991).
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